

## Message Text

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INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 IO-14 OMB-01 EB-11

OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01 /163 W  
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P 161454Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2795

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 VIENNA 4399

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPS MAY 15, 1974

REF: VIENNA 4398

FOLLOWING IS CONTINUATION OF REPORT OF INFORMAL SESSION  
WITH EASTERN REPS ON MAY 15, 1974. SUMMARY, CONTAINING  
PARAGRAPHS 1 THROUGH 3 TRANSMITTED REFTEL.

3. KHESTOV AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS AT RESUMPTION  
OF INFORMAL SESSIONS. HE SAID PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY  
FIXED AGENDA FOR THE MEETING; IT WAS "WHOSE FORCES  
SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET." HE INVITED  
ALLIED REPS TO BEGIN DISCUSSION.

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4. SPEAKING FROM POINTS PREVIOUSLY AGREED BY AD HOC  
GROUP, NETHERLANDS REP SAID IT HAD BEEN AGREED AT THE  
APRIL 1 INFORMAL SESSION, AND CONFIRMED IN THE SESSION  
OF APRIL 8, THAT PARTICIPANTS IN THESE INFORMAL DIS-

CUSSIONS WOULD GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF "WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET." SOVIET REPS HAD JUST CONFIRMED THIS POINT. IT HAD ALSO BEEN AGREED THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THIS FORMULATION AS THE BASIS OF FURTHER DISCUSSION WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSITION OF EITHER SIDE REGARDING OTHER ASPECTS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

5. AS EASTERN REPS KNEW, ALLIES BELIEVED THAT U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED IN A FIRST PHASE. EASTERN REPS HAD TOLD WESTERN REPS THAT EAST HAD CERTAIN PROBLEMS WITH THIS CONCEPT. WESTERN REPS WERE READY TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS WITH EASTERN REPS IN SPECIFIC TERMS. FIRST, HOWEVER, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO REVIEW THE MAIN POINTS ALLIES HAD MADE TO EASTERN REPS ON THIS ISSUE.

6. NETHERLANDS REP SAID, TO BEGIN WITH, ALLIES HAD GIVEN EASTERN REPS A NUMBER OF REASONS WHY THE U.S. AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES FIRST. HE WOULD SUMMARIZE SOME OF THEM:

7. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, OWING TO THE SIZE OF THEIR MILITARY RESOURCES AND THEIR STATUS AS MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS, BORE A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE AND FOR FACILITATING THE REDUCTION OF TENSIONS. REDUCTION OF THE FORCES BELONGING TO THE MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE. HENCE, AN AGREEMENT TO REDUCE U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO REDUCTION OF TENSIONS IN EUROPE. IT HAD BEEN SUGGESTED BY THE EASTERN SIDE THAT PARTICIPANTS TRY TO REACH AGREEMENT BY 1975. THE ALLIES WERE WILLING TO WORK TOWARD THIS GOAL. BUT TO REACH IT, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK OUT THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PRACTICAL APPROACH. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD MAXIMIZE THE CHANCES OF REACHING AGREEMENT IN THE  
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SHORTEST TIME. TO DEAL WITH U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES FIRST WAS THE DIRECT WAY TO DO THIS.

8. MOREOVER, THERE WERE A NUMBER OF GOOD REASONS WHY ALL THE ALLIES WISHED TO POSTPONE REDUCTION OF OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO A SECOND PHASE: THE CONCERNS OF THE PAST 25 YEARS OVER THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN EUROPE CONTINUED STRONG AND HAD RESULTED IN UNDERSTANDABLE DOUBTS. THESE COULD BE RESOLVED ONLY BY SUBSTANTIAL INITIAL REDUCTIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION AND WITH IT, THE UNITED STATES.

9. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN

PARTICIPANTS HAD STATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS. BUT THEY WERE IN A DIFFERENT SITUATION: THEY WERE ADVANTAGED BY THE FACT THAT THEIR PRINCIPAL ALLY, THE SOVIET UNION, BORDERED DIRECTLY ON THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE PRINCIPAL MILITARY POWER OF THE NATO ALLIANCE, THE UNITED STATES, WAS SEPARATED FROM ITS ALLIES BY THE ATLANTIC OCEAN.

10. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THERE WERE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF THE US AND THE USSR, AND THAT OF MOST WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US: POSSIBLE AGREEMENTS WOULD AFFECT ONLY A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE FORCES OF THE US AND OF THE USSR, AND EVEN SO, THE WITHDRAWAL OF THESE FORCES, AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER FORMS OF REDUCTION. THE SITUATION OF MOST OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT ONE: THEIR ENTIRE TERRITORIES LAY WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND WOULD BE AFFECTED BY THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT. THE FACT THAT THE UK AND CANADA WERE OUTSIDE THE AREA DID NOT CHANGE THEIR FUNDAMENTAL POSITION IN THIS MATTER. THE UK WAS PART OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC TO TREAT IT SEPARATELY FROM OTHER MEMBERS BECAUSE TO DO SO WOULD NOT CORRESPOND TO THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE. NO DID CANADA, WHICH IN ANY EVENT HAD ALREADY REDUCED ITS FORCES SUBSTANTIALLY, WISH TO BE TREATED SEPARATELY FROM THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.  
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PANTS.

11. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THESE WERE THE REASONS WHY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US WERE NOT PREPARED TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES UNTIL AFTER THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE FOR DOING SO HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED. THIS CONFIDENCE WOULD BE CREATED BY PRIOR US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING AS THE OVERALL GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THAT WAS WHY WESTERN REPS AGAIN WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT THE ROAD TO WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS WAS THROUGH A FIRST PHASE OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. IN MAKING THESE POINTS, WESTERN REPS WERE NOT LEAVING OUT OF ACCOUNT EASTERN INTEREST IN WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPATION. WESTERN REPS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THAT INTEREST. FOR THAT REASON, ALLIES HAD GIVEN EASTERN REPS A NUMBER OF CLARIFICATIONS CONCERNING PARTICIPATION OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A SECOND PHASE REDUCTION. FOR THEIR PART, WESTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT, TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE POINTS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THE PRACTICALITY OF A TWO-PHASE PROGRAM.

12. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THAT, TO REVIEW THESE POINTS:

A. ALLIES HAD PROPOSED A COMMON CEILING OF GROUND FORCES AND HAD SUGGESTED A LEVEL OF 700,000 TROOPS ON EACH SIDE TO BE REACHED IN TWO PHASES. ALLIES HAD IDENTIFIED THE CURRENT OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND MAN-POWER ON BOTH SIDES. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE FIGURES PROVIDED THE OVERALL DIMENSIONS OF THE REDUCSTIONS PROPOSED FOR BOTH SIDES.

B. ALLIES HAD SAID THAT A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE A PROVISION CONTAINING A COMMITMENT TO A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

C. ALLIES HAD SAID THAT THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD START WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT, AND ALSO THAT THE ACTUAL DURATION OF THIS FIXED PERIOD OF TIME WOULD BE AGREED DURING THE PHASE I NEGOTIATIONS AND SPECIFIED IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

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D. ALLIES HAD INDICATED THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE COMMON CEILING.

E. AND ALLIES HAD MADE CLEAR THAT, AS REGARDS THE WESTERN CONTRIBUTION, REDUCTIONS IN THAT SECOND PHASE WOULD FOCUS ON THE FORCES OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US.

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INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03

SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 IO-14 OMB-01 EB-11

OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01 (ISO) W  
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P 161454Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2796

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY  
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FROM US REP MBFR

13. TAKEN CUMULATIVELY, NETHERLANDS REP SAID, ALLIES BELIEVED THAT THESE POINTS DID IN FACT PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE PICTURE OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AS REGARDS REDUCTIONS UNDER THE WESTERN PROPOSALS. THEY MADE IT UNAMBIGUOUS THAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO COMMIT ITSELF TO A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS, IN WHICH ITS CONTRIBUTIONS WOULD FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF THE GROUND FORCES OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE U.S. AND TO FIX THE POINT AT WHICH THE NEGOTIATION OF THIS SECOND PHASE WILL BEGIN. WESTERN REPS REALIZED THAT IN MAKING THESE POINTS, ALLIES HAD NOT MET THE EASTERN DESIRE TO HAVE WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. HE HAD JUST SET FORTH ONCE MORE WHY THIS WAS EXCLUDED. BUT ALLIES REPRESENTATIVES HAD IN FACT SAID ENOUGH ON THIS TOPIC TO DEMONSTRATE IN ANY OBJECTIVE SENSE THAT THE WEST WAS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH WITH REGARD TO THOSE REDUCTIONS AND HAD PUT FORWARD A WORKABLE PROBLEM FOR MOVING TO THEM.

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14. NETHERLANDS REP CONCLUDED BY SAYING ALLIES BELIEVED THAT, WITH THIS BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD BE ABLE TO COME TO A PROMPT RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FIRST. WESTERN REPS BELIEVED ALLIES HAD ALREADY PUT FORWARD A PRACTICAL PROGRAM ON THIS ISSUE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF EASTERN REPS COULD DEFINE AS PRECISELY AS POSSIBLE REMAINING DIFFICULTIES THE EAST MIGHT HAVE WITH IT. IF PARTICIPANTS COULD THEN FOCUS ON THESE REMAINING SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, THEY WOULD TOGETHER BE IN A POSITION TO CONSIDER HOW THESE DIFFICULTIES MIGHT BE RESOLVED AND MIGHT THUS BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

15. KHLESTOV THANKED NETHERLANDS REP FOR "THIS PRECISE REPETITNN OF THE WESTERN POSITION" ON THE SUBJEC AT HAND. HE ASKED GDR AND POLISH REPS WHETHER THEY PREFERRED TO ASK SOME QUESTIONS OR FOR HIM TO PRESENT GENERAL VIEWS OF EAST ON THIS ISSUE. THE TWO EASTERN REPS REQUESTED KHLESTOV TO MAKE GENERAL STATEMENT FIRST.

16. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION WHAT NETHERLANDS REP HAD JUST SAID ON THE SUBJECT OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. FIRST OF ALL, HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL MEASURES HAVING TO DO WITH REDUCTION OF FORCES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND EVALUATED AS TO THEIR MERITS ON THE BASIS OF ONE AGREED PRINCIPLE, THE POINT IN THE AGREED COMMUNIQUE WHICH STATED "SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS

WILL HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY WORKED OUT IN SCOPE AND TIMING IN SUCH A WAY THAT THEY WILL IN ALL RESPECTS AND AT EVERY POINT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY." HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THAT AT EVERY POINT SPECIFIC MEASURES AND ALSO PROPOSALS SHOULD CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR EVERY PARTICIPANT. SINCE ALL PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WAS A FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD WORK OUT ALL MEASURES AND DECISIONS SO THAT EACH AND EVERY ONE OF THEM WOULD CONFORM TO THIS PRINCIPLE AT ANY POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND THE PROPOSALS OF EACH PARTY SHOULD BE EXAMINED AS TO WHETHER THEY CONFORMED TO THIS PRINCIPLE. NETHERLANDS REP HAD JUST NOW PRESENTED WESTERN PLAN AND IT FOLLOWED FROM HIS PRESENTATION

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THAT, EXCEPT FOR THE UNITED STATES NONE OF THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO MAKE REDUCTIONS, AT LEAST THIS WAS HOW HE READ IT. IN THIS SENSE, UNDER THE WESTERN PLAN, WEST WAS PROPOSING TO START REDUCTIONS WITH THE GROUND FORCES OF THE US AND OF THE USSR, AND IT FOLLOWED FROM THIS THAT OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT WISH TO MAKE REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THIS APPROACH RAN COUNTER TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WHICH HAD AS A COROLLARY THAT NO PARTICIPANT SHOULD RECEIVE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE OR MAKE PROPOSALS AIMED AT OBTAINING SUCH ADVANTAGE.

17. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE SOME SUBSTANTIATING ARGUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT WHICH WOULD NOT APPEAR NEW TO ALLIED REPS BUT WOULD SHOW REASONS FOR THE EASTERN POSITION: FIRST, WHAT WOULD BE THE PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES OF STARTING WITH THE US AND USSR REDUCTIONS? ACCORDING TO STATEMENTS MADE BY WESTERN OFFICIALS THEMSELVES, US FORCES ACCOUNTED FOR ONLY ONE-QUARTER OF NATO GROUND FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THIS CONTEXT HE WISHED TO REMIND PARTICIPANTS OF THE STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY RUSH, THAT OF 29 NATO DIVISIONS, ONLY FOUR WERE AMERICAN. ALLIED REPS WERE FULLY AWARE OF THESE FIGURES. ALSO ACCORDING TO THE ALLIES' OWN ESTIMATES, SOVIET GROUND FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE ACCOUNTED FOR 50 PERCENT OF THOSE WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES STATIONED IN THIS AREA. SO IT WAS A FACT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL HAD AS ITS CONSEQUENCE THAT IT COVERED ONLY ONE-QUARTER OF NATO GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BUT ONE-HALF OF WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE SAME AREA. THIS WAS ONE EXAMPLE SHOWING HOW THE WESTERN PROPOSAL RAN COUNTER TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, THAT IT WAS AIMED AT UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, AND WAS INEQUITABLE.

18. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, MOREOVER, US FORCES WERE STATIONED ONLY IN ONE PART OF THE FRG, WHEREAS USSR FORCES WERE STATIONED IN THE TERRITORY OF POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE GDR. AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS ALSO INEQUITABLE

WHEN APPLIED TERRITORILY. THESE TWO EXAMPLES SHOWED WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AT EVERY POINT. FURTHERMORE, BY PROPOSING TO MAKE REDUCTIONS OF THE GROUND FORCES OF THE US AND USSR ALONE FROM THE OUTSET, THE WEST LEFT OPEN THE RIGHT FOR THE REMAINING WESTERN DIRECT SECRET

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PARTICIPANTS TO BUILD UP THEIR FORCES. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOT GIVER FURTHER EXAMPLES SHOWING HOW WESTERN POROPSALS WERE IN CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY SINCE WHAT HE HAD ALREADY SAID MADE IT ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE ALLIED FIRST PHASE WAS AT VARIANCE WITH THAT PRINCIPLE. FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS OF THIS KIND WOUND NOT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY AND WOULD BE INEQUITABLE. BUT STARTING REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE EQUITABLE AND SHOULD CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO START WITH REDUCTION OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD IN FACT BE IN CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

19. KHLESTOV SAID HE WOULD NOT ON THIS OCCASION REPEAT ALL THE ARGUMENTS THE EAST HAD ADVANCED IN SUPPORT OF ITS OWN PROPOSAL THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. THESE REASONS WERE MILITARY, POLITICAL AND LEGAL IN NATURE. HE WOULD CITE ONLY TWO. IF ONE WERE SPEAKING IN TERMS OF EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHY SHOULD ONE NOT COVER THE ARMED FORCES OF SUCH MILITARILY IMPORTANT COUNTRIES SUCH AS THE FRG AND UK? THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD JUST INDICATED THAT BECAUSE THE US AND USSR WERE IMPORTANT MILITARY POWERS, THEY SHOULD REDUCE FIRST. BUT THE UK AND FRG WERE ALSO IMPORTANT MILITARILY. THEY BELONGED TO THAT GROUP OF 6 COUNTRIES WHICH POSSESS THE GREATEST MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE WORLD HIERARCHY. THEY WERE NOT AMONG MILITARY WEAK COUNTRIES, BUT AMONG THE POWERFUL ONES. THEIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WERE MILITARILY IMPORTANT. IN MANPOWER, FRG FORCES WERE LARGER THAN US FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

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OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01 /163 W

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P 161454Z MAY 74  
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TO SEXSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2797  
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY  
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

20. KHLESTOV SAID HE WISHED TO TURN TO ANOTHER POINT  
RAISED BY ALLIED REPS. IF EASTERN REPS FOR THEIR PART  
HAD PROPOSED REDUCTION OF TROOPS FOR ONLY THE WESTERN  
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, THEY COULD HAVE UNDERSTOOD THE ARGU-  
MENT ABOUT CONFIDENCE JUST ADVANCED BY THE NETHERLANDS  
REP. BUT CONFIDENCE WAS BUILT THROUGH COMMON ACTION BY  
ALL PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN REPS COULD NOT ACCEPT WESTERN  
ARGUMENT THAT IN ORDER TO CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF  
CONFIDENCE, THE US AND USSR SHOULD REDUCE FIRST. THIS  
WAS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL QUESTION AND ALSO INVOLVED A  
MORAL ASPECT. ALLIED REPS WERE ARGUING FOR THEIR DEFINITION  
OF CONFIDENCE, FOR HOW THEY UNDERSTOOD CONFIDENCE FROM THEIR  
OWN PERSPECTIVE. BUT WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS HAD THEIR  
OWN CONCEPT OF CONFIDENCE. ALLIED REPS WERE ACTING ON THE  
BASIS OF THEIR CONCEPTION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NATO  
AND THE WARSAW PACT. WARSAW PACT PARTICIPANTS WERE OPERATING  
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FROM THEIR OWN CONCEPT OF THIS. HOWEVER, IT WAS NOT  
THE AIM OF THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS TO DISCUSS THE VIEWS  
AND PERCEPTIONS OF EACH SIDE AS TO THE CHARACTER OF  
THE TWO ALLIANCES. AS FAR AS HE COULD DETERMINE, ALLIED  
REPS CONSIDERED THAT IN ORDER TO BUILD CONFIDENCES, THE USSR  
SHOULD REDUCE ITS FORCES FIRST AND THE US ALONG WITH IT.  
BUT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS' UNDERSTANDING OF CONFIDENCE  
WAS SUCH THAT ALL DIREST PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE  
FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS MIGHT HAVE PUT THE CON-  
FIDENCE ISSUE IN A WAY SO THAT US AND FRG SHOULD REDUCE  
FIRST IN ORDER TO CREATE ADEQUATE CONFIDENCE. BUT  
THIS HAD NOT BEEN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL  
WAS THAT ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD REDUCE  
THEIR FORCES ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS.

21. KHLESTOV SAID HE WAS NOT GOIN TO ATTEMPT  
ON THIS OCCASION TO DEAL WITH ALL THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED  
BY ALLIED REPS. HE FOUND A NUMBER OF THEM UNCONVINCING.  
FOR EXAMPLE, THE REASONS GIVEN AS TO WHY THE UK AND  
CANADA WERE NOT WILLING TO MAKE REDUCTIONS. EASTERN



REPS WOULD AT A LATER STAGE GO INTO THE ISSUE OF THE RELUCTANCE OF THESE COUNTRIES TO MAKE REDUCTIONS IN MORE DETAIL. HOWEVER, HE COULD SAY THAT ALLIED REPS WERE IN EFFECT ADVANCING THE ARGUMENT THAT THESE COUNTRIES DID NOT WISH TO MAKE REDUCTIONS SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WISH TO MAKE REDUCTIONS. THIS OF COURSE WAS NOT AN ARGUMENT. EASTERN REPS WERE LOOKING IN VIAN FOR OBJECTIVE REASONS FOR THIS RELUCTANCE. WHAT WAS REQUIRED FOR SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION WAS THE POLITICAL WILL TO MAKE REDUCTIONS. ANOTHER POINT: UNTIL RECENTLY, OFFICIALS OF WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD STRESSED THAT THEY WISHED TO COME TO VIENNA TO SEEK REDUCTIONS OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL TROOPS. THIS POINT HAD SBEEN STRESSED IN A NUMBER OF NATO DOCUMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE PUBLIC. IN ITS PRESENT GUISE, THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES APPEARED TO BE SHIFTING. AND THERE WAS A LEGITIMATE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO START REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET AND NOT SOMEWHERE IN THE DISTANT AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE.

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22. KHLESTOV SAID THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE WOULD BE A POLITICAL WILL ON THE PART OF BOTHER NATO AND THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO MAKE REDUCTIONS ON AN EQUITABLE BASIS, THAT IS TO SAY, TOGETHER FROM THE OUTSET. HE WISHED TO POINT OUT AFTER ALL 11 DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAD COME TO VIENNA FOR THE PURPOSE OF NEGOTIATING FORCE REDUCTIONS. PURE LOGIC INDICATED THAT THEY SHOULD ALL REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET AND THIS HAD BEEN THE BASIS FOR EASTERN POLICY. BUT FROM WHAT ALLIED REPS HAD JUST INDICATED, IT APPEARED THAT 6 OF THE 7 WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DID NOT WISH TO MAKE REDUCTIONS AND WISHED TO EVADE THEM BY POSTPONING REDUCTIONS TO SOME DISTANT AND UNSPECIFIED POINT IN THE FUTURE. HOW WOULD ALLIED REPS TAKE IT IF EASTERN REPS SUGGESTED THAT ALL ALLIES SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET, BUT THAT SOME WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD REDUCE AT SOME FUTURE UNSPECIFIED TIME? THIS WESTERN APPROACH DID NOT CREATE CONFIDENCE BUT RATHER DISTRUST ON THE EASTERN SIDE. SO IT SEEMED TO THE EASTERN REPS THAT THE TAST BEFORE PARTICIPANTS NOW WAS FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS TO START MAKING REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. THIS WOULD CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. IF ALLIED REPS HAD DIFFICULTIES IN WORKING OUT THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATION OF THIS PROPOSAL, EASTERN REPS WERE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THEM.

23. POLISH REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS. NETHERLANDS REP IN GIVING REASONS IN SUPPORT OF WESTERN TWO-PHASE PROPOSAL HAD REFERRED TO THE REASONS OF SOME

COUNTRIES FOR BEING WILLING TO PARTICIPATE NOW OR AT A LATER TIME. SINCE IT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE EASTERN

PARTICIPANTS TO WORK ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, BE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS ONLY FAIR IF POLISH, GDR AND CZECH REPS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO GIVE THEIR PARTICULAR NATIONAL REASONS FOR HOLDING THEIR VIEWPOINTS. NETHERLANDS REP HAD SKETCHED THE CONCERN OF WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WITH REGARD TO SOME ASPECTS OF THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION. THIS POINT WAS ALSO TRUE FOR EASTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS, WHO ALSO SAW SOME REASONS FOR SPECIAL CONCERN IN SOME PARTICULAR ASPECTS OF THE WESTERN  
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MILITARY SET-UP. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON AMONG OTHERS THAT THE THREE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES FELT THERE SHOULD BE REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, REFLECTING THE COMPOSITION OF THE ENTIRE MILITARY GROUP ON EACH SIDE.

24. POLISH REP SAID SOVIET REP HAD SPOKEN OF THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE US AND SOVIET COMPONENTS IN THE MILITARY GROUPING ON EITHER SIDE. IF ONE COMPARED THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE THREE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WITH THAT OF THE OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THERE WAS A PREPONDERANCE OF NATIONAL ELEMENTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE. NETHERLANDS REP HAD SAID THAT EASTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD NOT WORRY SINCE THEY HAD THE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE VALIDITY OF THE GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES ARGUMENT WAS DISPUTABLE. BUT IT WAS A FACT THAT EASTERN EUROPEAN CONCERN WAS CONNECTED DIRECTLY WITH THE NATIONAL ELEMENT OF NATO FORCES. THUS, IT WAS IMPORTANT BOTH FROM THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS THAT REDUCTIONS STARTED OFF IN A WAY WHICH INCLUDED ALL PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD HEARD CRITICISMS FROM THE WEST THAT WARSAW PACT VIEWS CONCENTRATED TOO MUCH ON ONE NATIONAL ELEMENT, THAT THEY WERE TOO EXCLUSIVELY ORIENTED ON THE BUNDESWEHR. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE BUNDESWEHR WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR THE EASTERN EUROPEANS BUT THEY NONETHELESS DID NOT GIVE IT UNFAIR EMPHASIS SINCE THEY WERE ALL READY TO REDUCE ON AN EQUAL BASIS SO THAT NO ONE COUNTRY WOULD SUFFER INEQUITABLY FROM THE REDUCTION OR COULD COMPLAIN THAT IT WAS SINGLED OUT UNDER SPECIAL PRESSURES.

25. POLISH REP SAID THAT WESTERN EFFORT TO ISOLATE AS COMMON ELEMENT THE FACT THAT THE APPROACHES OF BOTH SIDES FORESAW THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES WAS NOT A CORRECT APPROACH SINCE IT ARTIFICIALLY ISOLATED ONE ASPECT OF THE EASTERN PROGRAM AND LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT ITS CONNECTION WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF THE EASTERN PROGRAM. IT WAS OF

GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EASTERN EUROPEANS THAT OTHER FORCES  
IN THE AREA BE COVERED BY CLEARCUT OBLIGATIONS OF  
AN AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HAVE  
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REDUCTIONS OF ALL FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.

26. GDR REP SAID THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL FORCES  
HAD TO BE SOVED IN ANY CASE, SO WHY NOT FROM THE OUTSET.  
IF THE QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF NATIONAL FORCES IS LEFT  
OPEN, THERE WAS NO GUARANTEE THAT A SECOND PHASE WOULD  
TAKE PLACE, AND WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE  
FREE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCES. THIS COULD EVEN RESULT  
IN A HIGHER WESTERN TOTAL STRENGTH THAN BEFORE  
THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

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P 161454Z MAY 74  
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2798  
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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
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FROM US REP MBFR

27. US REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW REMARKS  
IN RESPONSE. FIRST, AS REGARDS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY,  
ALLIES CONTINUED TO BELIEVE IN THIS PRINCIPLE TO  
THE SAME DEGREE AS THEY HAD WHEN THEY AGREED TO ITS INCLUSION IN  
THE COMMUNIQUE. ALLIES CONSIDERED THAT THEIR CONCEPT  
OF PHASING WAS NOT IN ANY WAY INCONSISTENT WITH THAT

PRINCIPLE. THE PRESENT DISCUSSION WAS FOCUSED ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IN THE ALLIED VIEW, THE QUESTION OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WAS RELATED MORE DIRECTLY TO THE ISSUE OF DETERMINING THE CONTENT OF REDUCTIONS, HOW MUCH REDUCTION WOULD BE TAKEN BY EACH SIDE RATHER THAN TO THE ISSUE OF WHO SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. IT WAS PERFECTLY POSSIBLE TO AGREE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A FIRST PHASE OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND STILL CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY.

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28. US REP SAID SOME OF THE CONCERNS EASTERN REPS HAD EXPRESSED DELAT WITH WHAT ALLIES WOULD CALL PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. ALLIES BELIEVED THE WAY TO MAKE PROGRESS WAS TO DISCUSS THESE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND TO JOINTLY SEEK SOLUTIONS. ONE SPECIFIC CONCERN RAISED BY EASTERN REPS WAS SUCH A PRACTICAL PRBLEM AND ONE WHICH HAD A SIMPLE SOLUTION. SOVIET REP HAD POINTED OUT THAT US FORCES WERE STATIONED IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE WESTERN PART OF THE REDUCTION AREA, WHILE SOVIET FORCES WERE STATIONED IN BOTH THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH OF THE REDUCTION AREA. A PRACTICAL SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM WOULD BE AN UNDERSTANDING THAT AFTER REDUCTIONS HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIETS TO REDEPLOY THEIR REMAINING FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN ORDER TO SPREAD THE IMPACT OF REDUCTIONS IN WHATEVER WAY THE WARSAW PACT FELT JUSTIFIED.

29. US REP SAID THAT ANOTHER PRACTICAL PROBLEM TO WHICH SOVIET, POLISH AND GDR REPS HAD REFERRED WAS THAT NON-US POLISH AND GDR REPS HAD REFERRED WAS THAT NON-US WESTERN FORCES WOULD BE FREE TO INCREASE BETWEEN PHASES. IF EAST WERE WILLING TO AGREE TO SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH ALLIED REPS ON ALLIED CONCEPT OF PHASING, THIS ISSUE MIGHT THEN BECOME A PRACTICAL PROBLEM, TO WHICH A SOLUTION MIGHT HAVE TO BE SOUGHT. EASTERN REPS HAD MADE POINT THAT THEY MIGHT NOT THEMSELVES HAVE CONFIDENCE TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES IF ONLY US FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN IN THE WEST. HERE, ALLIED REPS BELIEVED THAT THE QUESTION OF CONFIDENCE RELATED TO THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE COMMITMENT UNDERTAKEN BY BOTH SIDES. THEY BELIEVED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF CONFIDENCE ON THE EASTERN SIDE IN THIS REGARD THROUGH THE TERMS OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE RESOLVED BY THE PROVISION OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH GAVE THE EAST ADEQUATE CONFIDENCE WHILE STOPPING SHORT OF ACTUAL REDUCTIONS BY THE WESTERN EUROPEANS.

30. KHLESTOV ASKED US REP TO REPEAT THIS POINT. US REP SAID ALLIES THOUGHT THAT, WHEN FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN FULLY FLESHED OUT, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO

GIVE EAST CONFIDENCE THAT WESTERN EUROPEANS WOULD  
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ACT IN WAY WHICH WOULD GIVE THE ASSURANCE EAST SOUGHT  
TO BEGIN SOVIET REDUCTIONS WITHOUT WESTERN EUROPEAN  
REDUCTIONS.

31. US REP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO STATED IN THIS  
CONNECTION THAT THE SECOND PHASE APPEARED TO THEM TO BE  
REMOTE AND UNCERTAIN. ALLIED REPS HAD ALREADY SAID THAT  
PHASE II WOULD START AT A SPECIFIC TIME WHICH COULD BE  
WORKED OUT JOINTLY. IF THE EAST SHOULD EVIDENCE SERIOUS  
INTEREST IN THE WESTERN PHASING APPROACH, PARTICIPANTS  
COULD SEEK WAYS TO TACKLE THIS ISSUE OF TIMING IN ORDER  
TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE ON THE EASTERN SIDE IN THE  
WORKABILITY OF THE WESTERN PLAN.

32. US REP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD POINTED TO THE MILITARY  
IMPORTANCE OF THE FRG AND UK FORCES. THESE FORCES WERE  
IMPORTANT. NONETHELESS, A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE US  
AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA AND OTHERS WAS REAL,  
CONSIDERABLE, AND GENERALLY RECOGNIZED. THERE WAS A  
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO LARGE NUCLEAR POWERS AND  
THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

33. US REP SAID HE COULD IDENTIFY ONE MORE PRACTICAL  
PROBLEM IN REMARKS MADE BY EASTERN REPS: THE QUESTION  
OF WHETHER PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE AN ACTUAL  
OUTCOME. HE CONSIDERED THIS TOO AS A PRACTICAL PROBLEM  
WHERE THERE COULD BE A POSSIBLE SOLUTION SHORT OF REQUIRING  
WESTERN EUROPEAN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. IN GENERAL,  
HE THOUGHT THAT, WHERE EAST WAS IN A POSITION TO IDENTIFY  
SPECIFIC PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN ALLIED APPROACH THIS WAS  
PRODUCTIVE APPROACH WHICH MIGHT ENABLE MOVEMENT.

34. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO ADD A FEW COMMENTS. HE  
DID NOT CONSIDER THAT IT COULD BE ARGUED CONVINCINGLY THAT THE  
FACT THAT THE ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL COVERED ONLY  
ONE-QUARTER OF NATO FORCES, WHILE IT COVERED 50 PERCENT  
OF WARSAW PACT FORCES, WOULD OF ITSELF DECREASE EASTERN  
SECURITY. AS EASTERN REPS KNEW, ALLIES DID NOT CONSIDER  
PRESENT BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE TO BE STABLE OR  
EQUITABLE. ALLIES HAD PROPOSED A COMMON CEILING IN  
GROUND FORCES AND THEY HAD ALSO PROPOSED THAT IN THE FIRST  
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AND SECOND PHASES OF REDUCTION, WARSAW PACT FORCES  
SHOULD BE REDUCED MORE THAN WESTERN FORCES. THE FACT  
THAT THE US FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA WERE SMALLER  
IN SIZE THAN SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WAS WHAT MADE IT

POSSIBLE FOR THE ALLIES TO SUGGEST REDUCTIONS OF ABOUT 15 PERCENT ON EACH SIDE FOR THESE FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE. THE SOVIET REP HAD REFERRED TO THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FRG AS ONE OF THE SIX LARGEST MILITARY FORCES IN THE WORLD. HE WAS NOT SURE THAT THIS WAS TRUE. THE ARMED FORCES OF AT LEAST INDIA, PAKISTAN AND SOUTH KOREA WERE LARGER. KHESTOV SAID HE WOULD LEAVE IT TO THE FRG MILITARY TO DECIDE WHICH WAS STRONGER FRG OR INDIAN FORCES. FRG REP SAID AS REGARDS CONFIDENCE IT WAS A FACT THAT CONFIDENCE WAS REQUIRED ON ALL SIDES. BUT IN REFERENCE TO ONE OF THE POLISH REP'S REMARKS, THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WERE SO LARGE AND U.S. FORCES SMALLER IN RELATION TO THEM MEANT THAT THE POLISH FORCES WERE IN THE COMFORTABLE SITUATION OF BEING UNDER A HUGE UMBRELLA OF SOVIET FORCES AND NO FURTHER CONFIDENCE WAS NEEDED FOR POLAND TO DECIDE TO REDUCE ITS FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. IN THE CASE OF THE FRG, HOWEVER, THE US UMBRELLA WAS SMALLER AND THUS THE FRG HAD TO HAVE MORE ASSURANCE IN ORDER TO REDUCE. AS US REP HAD SAID, THE PROBLEM OF HOW CONFIDENCE WAS CREATED ON PART OF EAST THAT OTHER WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS WAS A PRACTICAL ISSUE WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED. BUT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS IF THE ONLY EASTERN POSITION WAS THAT ALL SHOULD REDUCE FROM THE OUTSET. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT FOR WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WAS THAT THEY BE IN A POSITION TO KNOW WHERE THE REDUCTION PROCESS WAS LEADING TO. THIS WAS WHY THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND ITS ACCEPTANCE BY THE EAST WAS SO IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT. EASTERN REPS HAD REFERRED TO THE UK AND CANADIAN FORCES.

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USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 ACDE-00 SAM-01 DRC-01 /163 W

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P 161454Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2799

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

THE ALLIES COULD NOT ENTIRELY LEAVE OUT OF ACCOUNT THE FACT THE U.K. AND CANADIAN FORCES WERE NOW AT THEIR LOWEST POINT IN THE PERIOD OF THE PAST 20 YEARS, WHILE THE STRENGTH OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WAS AT ITS HIGHEST POINT IN THAT 20-YEAR PERIOD. HE WISHED TO SUPPORT THE SUGGESTION OF THE US REP THAT EASTERN REPS SHOULD NOT BASE THEIR APPROACH SOLELY ON PRINCIPLE BUT SHOULD TRY TO IDENTIFY AND SOLVE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS.

35. SMIRNOVSKY ASKED, WHAT ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, DID ALLIES WISH TO LEAVE THIS PRINCIPLE ASIDE? FRG REP SAID THIS WAS A COMMONLY AGREED PRINCIPLE AND THE BASIS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. HIS MEANING WAS THAT EAST SHOULD NOT TAKE A POSITION OF PRINCIPLE ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. IF THE EASTERN POSITION WERE SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY THAT ALL SHOULD PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET, AND THE EAST WERE NOT WILLING TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL ISSUES,  
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IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THIS FIELD.

36. KHLESTOV SAID THAT, AS HE UNDERSTOOD IT, THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS HAD TOUCHED BOTH ON SOME GENERAL IDEAS AND ON SOME PRACTICAL PROBLEMS. HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSION THUS FAR. ON THE ONE HAND, THE EAST BELIEVED PARTICIPANTS SHOULD SEEK COMMON GROUND AND EAST HAD ACTED IN THIS SENSE. BUT SOMETIMES IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO SHOW NEGOTIATING PARTNERS WHAT EASTERN POSITION REALLY WAS SO LATTER COULD BETTER UNDERSTAND IT. IF WESTERN REPS DID NOT UNDERSTAND EASTERN POSITION CORRECTLY, THEY MIGHT MAKE SOME INCORRECT PROJECTIONS OR PREDICTIONS. FRG REP HAD JUST SPOKEN OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. ACCORDING TO HIM, CANADA HAD A SMALL CONTINGENT OF FORCES IN THE AREA. THIS WAS TRUE FOR THE U.K. AND ALSO FOR THE U.S. IF THIS WAS SO, WHO REALLY DID HAVE THE LARGE FORCES IN THE AREA? THE FRG?

37. KHLESTOV SAID IT WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL THAT THE EASTERN REPS ALWAYS POINTED OUT THAT ESTIMATES OR EVALUATIONS OF MILITARY STRENGTH HAD TO BE BASED ON THE EVALUATION OF ALL COMPONENTS TAKEN TOGETHER IN THEIR TOTALITY. EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY MADE THIS POINT IN DETAIL AND IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO REPEAT IT. BUT THE EASTERN VIEW WAS THAT THE ONLY CORRECT APPRAISAL OF THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT FORCES STATIONED IN CENTRAL EUROPE WAS THAT MADE WHEN THESE FORCES WERE CONSIDERED IN THEIR TOTALITY, NOT THROUGH EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL PARTS LIKE CANADIAN AND U.K. FORCES, BUT THE TOTAL STRENGTH ON EACH SIDE. THIS WAS THE POSITION FROM WHICH EASTERN REPS ESTIMATED THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF EACH SIDE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE BASIS FROM WHICH EAST PROCEEDED TO CONSIDER HOW THESE

FORCES MIGHT BE REDUCED. THIS WAS A SCIENTIFIC AND EQUITABLE APPROACH WHICH REQUIRED REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. FROM A MILITARY VIEWPOINT, ANY ATTEMPT TO SINGLE OUT FOR REDUCTION THE FORCES OF ANY ONE PARTICIPANT SUCH AS THE FRG OR GDR WOULD NOT BE JUSTIFIABLE. AS A CONSEQUENCE, EASTERN REPS FELT THEIRS WAS THE APPROACH WHICH SHOULD BE APPLIED. FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THEIR TOTALITY. IF HIS MEMORY SERVED HIM CORRECTLY, IN PREVIOUS INFORMAL MEETINGS, PARTICIPANTS HAD REACHED A COMMON UNDERSTANDING THAT THE MILITARY POWER OF EACH SIDE SHOULD BE APPRAISED IN THEIR TOTALITY. THESE MIGHT BE DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS, BUT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED  
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SECURITY MUST BE UPHELD BY REDUCTIONS OF ALL FROM THE OUTSET. THIS WAS THE FIRST POINT TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. IF WEST AGREED WITH THIS APPROACH, PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONSIDER THE TWO MILITARY GROUPS IN THEIR TOTALITY AND MAKE APPROPRIATE REDUCTIONS.

38. KHESTOV SAID THERE WAS A SECOND POINT TO WHICH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY WAS APPLICABLE. THIS PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE APPLIED NOT ONLY TO REDUCTIONS, BUT TO THE ISSUE OF WHO SHOULD REDUCE. IN FACT, THE PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS APPLYING TO EVERY ASPECT OF REDUCTIONS. AS REGARDS PRACTICAL PROBLEMS, IF ALLIES HAD PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES WITH THE EASTERN APPROACH, THEY COULD BE CONSIDERED IN DISCUSSION OF HOW REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE APPLIED. HE HAD NOT HEARD ANY CONVINCING ARGUMENTS WHY THE FRG, U.K. AND ALSO BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS SHOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. FOR EXAMPLE, BOTH BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS HAD TWO CATEGORIES OF FORCES; THOSE STATIONED ON THE TERRITORY OF THE FRG WERE FOREIGN TROOPS. SO THE CONSEQUENCES OF REDUCING THIS TYPE OF TROOPS WOULD BE THE SAME AS REDUCING FOREIGN TROOPS. THIS VARIANT COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

39. POLISH REP SAID THAT SINCE FRG REP HAD MENTIONED THE COMFORTABLE POSITION OF POLAND, HE WISHED TO MAKE SOME REMARKS. WITH REGARD TO FRG REP'S REFERENCE TO THE EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION BY EACH SIDE, HE THOUGHT IT BETTER NOT TO DISCUSS THIS IN THE PRESENT INFORMAL SESSIONS. THE TOPIC HAD ALREADY RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION IN PLENARY SESSIONS. IT WAS NOT CONNECTED WITH THE EFFORT TO RESOLVE WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET; ALTHOUGH OF COURSE IT COULD BE DISCUSSED. FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF POLISH INTERESTS, IF ONE TOOK THE WESTERN PLAN FOR PHASE ONE, WHAT THE POLES SAW WAS THAT A PORTION OF THE SOVIET FORCES, FORCES WHICH PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF POLAND, WOULD BE WITHDRAWN, BUT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO COMPARABLE REDUCTION OF THE WESTERN SIDE. SECOND, THE WESTERN POSITION WOULD NOT PROVIDE STRONG ENOUGH GUARANTEES OF THE PARTICIPATION OF OTHER FORCES IN THE AREA, WHICH MIGHT AS A CONSEQUENCE INCREASE. AS REGARDS THE ISSUE OF CONSIDERING PRACTICAL QUESTIONS VERSUS STICKING ON PRINCIPLES,



THE WEST TOO HAD A POSITION OF PRINCIPLE, IN FAVOR OF REDUCTIONS  
OF U.S. AND USSR FORCES FROM THE OUTSET. THERE WAS NO POINT IN  
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ALLIED REPS ARGUING THAT THE EAST SHOULD NOT TAKE UP A POSITION  
OF PRINCIPLE IF THEY WERE DOING SO THEMSELVES. PRACTICAL QUESTIONS  
HAVING TO DO WITH THE POSITIONS OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED  
IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSIONS.

40. NETHERLANDS REP SAID THERE HAD BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION THUS FAR  
ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. US REP HAD BEEN  
CORRECT IN SAYING THIS WAS A PRACTICAL ISSUE BEARING ON THE CONTENT  
OF REDUCTIONS. MOREOVER, THIS PRINCIPLE WAS A STANDARD WHICH  
SHOULD BE APPLIED MOST SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE FINAL OUTCOME  
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH COULD BE JUDGED NOT MERELY IN TERMS  
OF THE SCALE OF THE REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY ONE SIDE OR THE  
OTHER. AS REGARDS THAT OUTCOME, IT WAS THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE  
TO REACH APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCE STRENGTH ON EACH  
SIDE. THIS OBJECTIVE HAD BOTH SECURITY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS.  
POLITICAL IN THE SENSE OF ITS RELEVANCE TO THE WESTERN POLICY  
OF DETENTE. IT WAS THEREFORE QUITE NORMAL THAT THOSE WHO  
HAD MORE FORCES IN THE AREA SHOULD REDUCE MORE. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR  
THAT, IN THE FINAL OUTCOME, ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD HAVE  
A COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY. TO BE FRANK, HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND  
HOW WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES COULD BE SAID TO BE ACTING  
CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY IN NOT  
PARTICIPATING IN REDUCTIONS FROM THE OUTSET. EASTERN REPS HAD  
THEMSELVES ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS VIGOROUSLY PROPOSED SYMBOLIC  
REDUCTIONS OF A SIZE WHICH QUITE CLEARLY HAD NOT SIGNIFICANCE FOR  
MILITARY SECURITY. HE ALSO WISHED TO POINT OUT IN PASSING THAT  
ANY REDUCTION WOULD OF ITS NATURE IMPOSE A LIMIT ON THE  
FORCES OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHOLLY WITHIN THE AREA. SINCE THIS WAS  
THE CASE, SUCH A LIMITATION WOULD PLACE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS  
IN A POSITION OF INFERIORITY AS REGARDS JURIDICAL LIMITATIONS  
IMPOSED ON THEM IN RELATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES NOT SO LIMITED.  
HENCE, THESE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT BE ASKED TO ACCEPT  
SUCH LIMITATIONS WITHOUT RECEIVING IN RETURN ANY SUBSTANTIAL  
CONTRIBUTION TO THEIR SECURITY POSITION. SUCH AN IMPROVEMENT  
IN THEIR SECURITY POSITION WOULD NOT RESULT FROM THE SYMBOLIC  
REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST. SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS WOULD HAVE  
THE NEGATIVE IMPLICATION JUST CITED AND THEREFORE WOULD FAIL  
TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY SINCE  
THEY WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF IMPOSING UNEQUAL OBLIGATIONS ON  
SOME PARTICIPANTS.

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41. NETHERLANDS REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO THEMSELVES  
SAID ON CERTAIN OCCASIONS THAT WHAT WAS REALLY IMPORTANT WITH  
REGARD TO WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN A FIRST PHASE OF SYMBOLIC

REDUCTIONS WAS THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THESE WESTERN REDUCTIONS. SINCE THE MILITARY EFFECTS OF SUCH REDUCTIONS WOULD BE BEGLIGIBLE, THE ISSUE BECAME A PRACTICAL PROBLEM, THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEMONSTRATE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WHOLE OPERATION. BUT A DEMONSTRATION THAT ALL WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE OVERALL REDUCTION PROCESS COULD BE GIVEN IN OTHER WAYS THAN BY ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS, AND HE THOUGHT THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE POINTS WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED FURTHER.

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SS-20 USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 SAM-01 IO-14 OMB-01 EB-11

OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01 /163 W

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P 161454Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

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SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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FROM US REP MBFR

42. NETHERLANDS REP COMMENTED THAT SOVIET REP HAD JUST ASSERTED THAT BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS HAD TWO SEPARATE CATEGORIES OF TROOPS IN THE AREA, THOSE STATIONED AT THEIR HOMELAND, AND THOSE STATIONED IN THE FRG. HE DID NOT WISH TO SPEAK FOR BELGIUM ON THIS OCCASION, BUT WISHED TO MAKE IT QUITE CLEAR THAT THE NETHERLANDS DID NOT MAKE THIS DISTINCTION. IF AND WHEN NETHERLANDS AGREED TO MAKE REDUCTIONS, THEY WOULD APPLY TO THE NETHERLANDS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN THE ENTIRE AREA AS SUCH.

43. SOVIET REP ASKED WHETHER NETHERLANDS FORCES STATIONED IN THE FRG WOULD BE REDUCED AND WHAT WOULD BECOME OF THEM. ACCORDING TO THE ALLIED PROPOSAL, THE US TROOPS WOULD BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA. BUT

FORCES REDUCED WITHIN THE AREQ WOULD HAVE TO BE  
DEMOBILIZED. DID THIS MEAN THAT REDUCED NETHERLANDS  
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FORCES WOULD HAVE TO BE DEMOBILIZED?

44. FRG REP SAID PARTICIPANTS WERE DISCUSSING FORCES  
IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WHICH HAD BEEN  
AGREED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THE NATIONAL BORDERS  
WITHIN THE AREA WERE NOT GERMANE TO THE DISCUSSION.  
THE DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES WITHIN THE REDUCTION AREA  
ALSO WAS, IRRELEVANT AND OUTSIDE THE AGREED RANGE OF  
THESE NEGOTIATIONS.  
SOVIET REP WAS APPARENTLY MAKING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN  
BELGIUM AND NETHERLANDS FORCES OUTSIDE THE FRG AND THOSE  
INSIDE IT. IN DOING SO HE APPEARED TO BE AIMING AT ARRANGEMENTS  
WHICH WOULD APPLY ONLY TO THE FRG. THIS WAS  
A SERIOUS MATTER AND WOULD REINFORCE THE FRG FEELING  
THAT MORE CONFIDENCE WAS NEEDED BEFORE THERE COULD BE  
FRG REDUCTIONS.

45. SOVIET REP SAID PARTICULARLY THAT HE WAS "SORRY" THIS SUBJECT  
HAD COME UP AND THAT FRG REP WAS "DRAGGING IN SOM TERRIBLE  
THINGS". FRG REP SAID ALLIES WOULD NOT AGREE TO MAKE  
FRG A SPECIAL SUB-AREA OF THE AGREED AREA OF REDUCTION.

46. SMIRNOVSKY SAID THAT EVEN NATO DOCUMENTS ESTAB-  
LISHED TWO CATEGORIES, FOREIGN AND NATIONAL TROOPS.  
KHLESTOV SAID THAT FROM THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL VIEW-  
POINT, THE CATEGORIES OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN TROOPS  
EXISTED. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE ARE US AND SOVIET TROOPS  
IN THE AREA. SOVIET TROOPS IN THE AREA WERE FOREIGN  
TROOPS UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THEIR OWN  
GOVERNMENT AND NOT OF OTHER AUTHORITIES. THE SAME  
DISTINCTION WAS MADE IN PUBLISHED IN NATO DOCUMENTS.  
THERE WAS A LEGAL AND POLITICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  
FOREIGN AND NATIONAL FORCES. NETHERLANDS REP ASKED  
WHETHER USSR INTENDED TO ASK FOR NETHERLANDS  
REDUCTIONS ONLY FROM NETHERLANDS TROOPS STATIONED IN  
THE FRG. KHLESTOV SAID THOSE NETHERLANDS FORCES IN FRG  
WERE FOREIGN TROOPS. FRG REP SAID SOVIET REP WAS APPARENTLY  
ATTEMPTING TO DIVIDE THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS INTO SUB-AREAS.  
THIS WOULD MAKE THE NEGOTIATIONS VERY DIFFICULT. KHLESTOV  
CLAIMED THAT IT WAS NATO THAT HAD ORIGINALLY RAISED THE  
CATEGORIES OF NATIONAL AND FOREIGN FORCES. FRG REP SAID  
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THIS HAD BEEN DONE BEFORE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED IN  
VIENNA ON THE REDUCTIONS AREA. DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES  
WITHIN THE WESTERN OR EASTERN PART OF THE REDUCTION AREA

WAS AN AFFAIR OF EACH ALLIANCE; THERE WAS NO DIFFERENCE IN THE QUALITY OF NETHERLANDS TROOPS STATIONED IN THE FRG AND THOSE STATIONED IN THE NETHERLANDS THEMSELVES. THE POLISH REP SAID THAT POLAND WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT COMMITMENTS AS TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF POLISH FORCES OUTSIDE OF POLAND. FRG REP AND US REP REPLIED THAT NO SUCH COMMITMENT WAS NEEDED.

47. KHLESTOV SAID THIS TOPIC WAS A SIDE ISSUE. IT WAS NOT IMPORTANT TO MAKE THIS DISTINCTION HERE. THE MAIN ISSUE HE HAD RAISED WAS NOT THIS DISTINCTION BUT WHY THE NETHERLANDS WAS NOT READY TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE.

48. NETHERLANDS REP SAID HE HAD ALREADY GIVEN THE REASON WHY THE NETHERLANDS DID NOT WISH TO REDUCE ITS FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE. BUT IN EXCHANGE FOR THE JURIDICAL LIMITATIONS WHICH ANY FORM OF REDUCTION WOULD IMPOSE ON THE WHOLE NETHERLANDS DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, THE NETHERLANDS WOULD WISH TO RECIEVE SOME INCREASE IN ITS SECURITY. IN THE ALLIED VIEW, THIS SHOULD TAKE THE FORM OF EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING AND ITS REALIZATION IN TWO PHASES OF REDUCTION. ONLY THEN WOULD THE NETHERLANDS BE WILLING TO ACCEPT THE LIMITATIONS ON ITS FORCES HE HAD MENTIONED. THIS WAS A SERIOUS ISSUE OF NATIONAL INTEREST.

49. GDR REP SAID ALLIES WANTED TO CHANGE THE EXISTING BALANCE OF FORCES ALREADY IN THE FIRST PHASE THROUGH UNEQUAL REDUCTIONS. THIS APPROACH CREATED A LOT OF QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER A RESULT WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN TERMS OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE QUESTION REMAINED WHETHER THE WEST'S REAL REASON IN WISHING TO DIVIDE NEGOTIATIONS INTO TWO PHASES WAS NOT TO SECURE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE FOR THE WEST. EAST REPS HAD WELL-FOUNDED SUSPICIONS AS TO WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY OUTCOME LATER ON. MOREOVER, EAST DID NOT KNOW WHAT THE REMAINING WESTERN COUNTRIES REALLY INTENDED TO DO  
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IN THE INTERVAL. THE PARTIES COULD NOT DO ANYTHING IN TWO PHASES WHICH THEY COULD NOT ALREADY DO IN A SINGLE PHASE. IN THE FIRST PHASE ONE COULD FROM THE OUTSET DECIDE THE SIZE OF REDUCTIONS AND THEIR TIMING. IF THIS WERE DONE ALL PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ABLE TO SEE THE RESULTS AND THE OUTCOME FROM THE OUTSET. HE COULD SEE NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRACTICE AND PRINCIPAL HERE, NOR ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY EFFECT. THE EAST HAD PROPOSED SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS NOT ONLY FOR THEIR POLITICAL EFFECT. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL WAS INTENDED AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS BASED ON

EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTIONS. IT SHOULD SHOW THE WILL OF ALL PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE IN A WAY WHICH ASSURED THE INDIVIDUAL SECURITY OF ALL. UNDER THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN REDUCTION WAS NOT GUARANTEED. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TELL THE EAST WHAT PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES THEY HAD WITH THE CONCEPT OF REDUCTIONS BY ALL FROM THE OUTSET.

50. NETHERLANDS REP COMMENTED THAT SECURITY WAS SHARED BY ALL. IT WAS A JOINT CONDITION. IT COULD NOT BE DIVIDED SO THAT ONE SIDE HAD MORE THAN THE OTHER. THE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS GREATER STABILITY FOR EUROPE. ALLIED REPS HAD GIVEN REASONS WHY WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US DID NOT WISH TO PARTICIPATE FROM THE OUTSET. IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT CONVERSATION, ALLIED REPS HAD IDENTIFIED A NUMBER OF PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WHICH HAD ARISEN WHICH IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO CONTINUE DISCUSSING. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BRING THE VIEWPOINTS CLOSER AND THUS REACH AGREEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET.

51. FRG REP SAID ALLIES HAD INDICATED HOW MANY FORCES MIGHT BE REDUCED IN THE FIRST PHASE AND IN THE SECOND AND HAD SUGGESTED THE COMMON CEILING AS THE OVERALL GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIET REPS CLAIMED ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE LOOKED AT IN THEIR  
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TOTALITY. BUT FUTURE AGREEMENTS WOULD NOT COVER THE TOTAL OF US AND SOVIET FORCES. THESE FORCES WOULD ONLY BE WITHDRAWN; THE SOVIET FORCES ONLY A SHORT DISTANCE. THE TERRITORY AND FORCES OF MOST OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ON THE OTHER HAND WOULD BE COVERED IN THEIR TOTALITY. THIS WOULD BE A STEP OF MUCH GREATER CONSEQUENCE THAN WITHDRAWAL OF A PORTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES. IN THE CASE OF POLISH FORCES, THE FACT OF THE SOVIET UMBRELLA AND THE DISTANCE OF POLAND FROM THE LINE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST CREATED A SITUATION WHICH MADE APPARENT THE FACTORS HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED NOT SO RELEVANT FOR POLAND AS THEY WERE FOR THE FRG.

52. US REP SAID PARTICIPANTS MIGHT IN THE NEXT SESSION CONTINUE TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES AND SEEK ANSWERS TO THEM. HE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET WAS NOT MERELY THAT THE ANSWER SHOULD BE US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST, BUT US AND SOVIET FORCES FIRST PLUS PROVISIONS IN A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WHICH GAVE SUFFICIENT ASSURANCES TO CREATE CONFIDENCE ON

PART OF THE EAST TO ENTER ON THE TWO-PHASE CONCEPT.

53. KHLESTOV RAISED ISSUE OF TIMING OF NEXT PLENARY.  
ALLIES REPS SAID IT WAS DESIRE OF ALLIES THAT NEXT PLENARY  
TAKE PLACE IN THE MORNING OF MAY 22. ALLIED REPS SUG-  
GESTED THAT NEXT INFORMAL SESSION TAKE PLACE ON THE  
AFTERNOON OF MAY 22. EASTERN REPS AGREED ON BOTH  
POINTS. HUMES

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

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**Capture Date:** 27 JUL 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** ARMED FORCES, MEETING PROCEEDINGS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 16 MAY 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
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**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 26 MAR 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
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**TAGS:** PARM, US, NL, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO NATO  
BONN  
LONDON  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005